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Abstract—When dealing with privatized data, it is important
to be able to protect against malformed user inputs. This becomes
difficult in MPC systems as each server should not contain
enough information to know what values any user has submitted.
In this paper, we implement an MPC technique to verify blinded
user inputs are unit vectors. In addition, we introduce a BGW
circuit which can securely aggregate the blinded inputs while
only releasing the result when it is above a public threshold.
These distributed techniques take as input a unit vector. While
this initially seems limiting compared to real number input, it is
quite powerful for cases such as selecting from a list of options,
indicating a location from a set of possibilities, or any system
which uses one-hot encoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
In our system, a user would like to input an N long unit
vector; however, no strict subset of the servers should be able
to recreate user inputs. The servers should then be able to
verify that the user’s input was a unit vector. In addition,
the servers should then be able to aggregate all user inputs
and release the value only if it is above a public threshold.
The verification circuit is an implementation of the MPC
protocol described in [1]. This scheme takes input vectors,
blinds (randomizes) the values, and then splits each value
across all verification servers. The result is that no strict subset
of the servers which collaborate can distinguish the inputs
from random. However, all servers working together can verify
that an input is a unit vector without revealing any other
information about the input. Finally, the servers can combine
all user inputs to perform an aggregate on each element of the
inputs by using the BGW circuit shown in Figure 1. In other
words, let N be the input length and ` be the number of user
inputs. This data can be represented as an `xN matrix where
each row is a user input, and the aggregation is a sum on
each column, thus giving N aggregation results. We will now
discuss the implementation of the verification and aggregation
circuits as well as their performance.
II. VERIFICATION
Assume a user wants to submit an N long vector
V = [v1, . . . , vN ], and we want to verify that it is a unit
vector using P parties without any party learning the user’s
vector input. The verification scheme is as follows:
1) The user splits V into a PxN matrix (Split), such that∑
i Splitij = vj .
2) The user blinds Split into a PxP matrix Blind using one
of the three algorithms discussed in Section II-B.
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Fig. 1. BGW Multiparty Aggregation Circuit
A multiparty computation circuit which uses BGW and Shamir’s
Secret Sharing Algorithm to compute the aggreagate of all inputs
xi and only release it if it is above the publicly known threshold.
3) The user sends one Px1 column vector
sharei =
sharei,1...
sharei,P
 =
blind1,i...
blindP,i

from Blind to each verifier.
4) Verifiers perform an MPC sum on each row of the shares
to get the Px1 vector
Sums =
sum1...
sumP

where
sumj =
∑
i
sharei,j
5) Validation functions are performed on Sums to check V
was was a unit vector.
It is important to note that all operations are done in a
finite field with a prime size which is randomly chosen. The
recommended size is at least 256 bits, and the performance
impacts of differnet field sizes are discussed in Section IV-A.
A. Splitting
The user starts with a unit vector V = [v1, . . . , vN ].
For each vj , j ∈ {1, . . . , N} the user generates random
values spliti,j , i ∈ {1, . . . , P − 1}. Then they set
splitp,j = vj −
∑
i spliti,j . After this is done for all N rows,
the result is Split, a PxN matrix where
∑
i Spliti,j = vj .
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B. Blinding
There are 3 functions defined in [1] for blinding which we
implemented: Square, Product, and Inverse. Let L be a
PxN matrix used to blind Split, and r is a PxN matrix of
random values. After the L matrix is generated, we perform
Blind = L*Split to calculate our blinded PxP matrix. It is
important to note that all calculations are done in a finite
field of prime size. The constructions of the L matrix for the
various blinding techniques are below:
Square:
L ∈ FPxN
L1,j = r1,j ∀j s.t. 0 < j ≤ N
Li,j = ri1,j ∀i, j s.t. 1 < i ≤ P , 0 < j ≤ N
The result is a matrix
Lsq =

r1,1 r1,2 . . . r1,N
r21,1 r
2
1,2 . . . r
2
1,N
...
...
rP1,1 r
P
1,2 . . . r
P
1,N

Product:
L ∈ FPxN
Li,j = ri,j ∀i, j s.t. 0 < i < P , 0 < j ≤ N
LP,j =
P−1∏
i=1
ri,j ∀j s.t. , 0 < j ≤ N
The result is a matrix
Lprod =

r1,1 r1,2 . . . r1,N
r2,1 r2,2 . . . r2,N
...
...∏
i ri,1
∏
i ri,2 . . .
∏
i ri,N

Inverse:
L ∈ FPxN
Li,j = ri,j ∀i, j s.t. 0 < i < P , 0 < j ≤ N
LP,j =
[
P−1∏
i=1
ri,j
]−1
∀j s.t. , 0 < j ≤ N
The result is a matrix
Linv =

r1,1 r1,2 . . . r1,N
r2,1 r2,2 . . . r2,N
...
...[∏
i ri,1
]−1 [∏
i ri,2
]−1
. . .
[∏
i ri,N
]−1

C. Sharing
After the user calculates Blind, they split it into P, Px1
column vectors
sharei =
sharei,1...
sharei,P
 =
blind1,i...
blindP,i

The client sends one sharei to each verifier. Before the
verifiers can check if the input vector is valid, they must first
sum their shares into a Px1 vector
Sums =
sum1...
sumP

where
sumj =
∑
i
sharei,j
This is acheived through any MPC summation scheme which
does not reveal any information but the final value. Every
verifier will calculate the same Sums vector.
D. Validation
Based on the method chosen for blinding, there are 3
ways to verify that the original input vector was a unit
vector [1]. Sums is the Px1 vector which is the result
of the MPC sum done by the verifiers. To verify, simply
check the relation below holds for the chosen blinding method.
Square:
Sumsi1 = Sumsi ∀i, 0 < i ≤ P
Product:
SumsP =
P−1∏
i=1
Sumsi
Inverse:
P∏
i=1
Sumsi = 1
E. Security
At no point does any individual have enough information
to reconstruct a user’s input. In addition, after the user splits
their value into P shares, any subset of those P shares appears
random (as each share is a randomly generated bit-array).
This ensures that as long as there is at least one honest party,
security holds. However, for correctness to hold, all parties
must act in an honestly-but-curious way.
III. BGW AGGREGATION
Once all users’ inputs are validated, it is convenient to be
able to aggregate the initial unit vectors. However, we wish
for the servers to never be able to reconstruct any individual’s
input. We will now describe a BGW circuit which returns
a sum per entry in the Nx1 input vectors across all users’
inputs, and each entry’s result is only released if it is above
a publicly known threshold. In other words, all ` inputs can
be thought of as an `xN matrix where each row is a user’s
input, and we will perform a sum on each column. Our BGW
circuit can be seen in Figure 1.
First, each user performs a sum on the blinded values
they received from all users. Then, they use Shamir’s Secret
Sharing Algorithm [2] to create shares and distribute one
to each participating server. These are the inputs to the
BGW circuit in Figure 1. Next, each server locally computes
the sum of shares (sum) and subtracts the publicly known
threshold (thresh), to get dif = sum − thresh. Next, we
use the BGW bit conversion algorithm described in [3] to get
the encrypted bit representation of dif , called difb. We then
take the most significant bit of difb (called msb), calculate
(1 − msb) ∗ sum, and reveal the result. If msb = 0 then
sum ≥ thresh, so we reveal the aggregate. If msb = 1 then
sum < thresh so 0 is returned. This ensures that we only
release the aggregate value if it is above thresh.
The BGW bit conversion described in [3] works as follows.
The algorithm takes as input an encrypted share [a]p and
returns an array of encrypted shares [a]b. When decrypted,
[a]b is the bit representation of decrypted [a]p. This is done
by generating an array of shares [b]b which represent random
bits. Next, we reveal c = ([a]p − [b]b) and convert it to
bit representation in the clear. [a]b = c + [b]b can now be
computed. In our implementation, we do not reveal any bits
as we only need the encrypted value of the MSB.
This circuit relies on manipulation of Shamir’s Secret
Shares, which we know is resilient to M < P/3 malicious
adversaries where P is the number of participating parties [4].
It also relies on the BGW Bit Conversion described in [3]
which they prove is secure against an adversary which
controls M < b(P − 1)/2c honest-but-curious participants.
IV. PERFORMANCE
A. Verification
We will now discuss the performance of our
implementations for the verification and aggregation schemes
described above. Our verification scheme is lightweight and
fast. Running on consumer grade hardware, we can run
thousands of verifications simultaneously at roughly the same
latency as running 100 queries simultaneously. In general, a
verifier takes between 350 and 550 ms, and the client takes
20 to 50 ms for normal operating modes per query. There
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Fig. 2. Algorithm Performance (Client)
Client latency for various sizes of finite field for the 3 blinding
algorithms.
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Fig. 3. Finite Field Size vs Latency (Server)
The latency observed by the servers for various finite field size.
are five parameters which affect execution time which we
will analyze in turn: field size, blinding algorithm, number of
simultaneous queries, length of input vector, and number of
verifiers.
When verifying, a random prime is selected for the
finite field size used in all our arithmetic. The length
of this field does not drastically affect the verifiers, but
the client’s performance is drastically impacted by the
number of bits in the chosen prime. The client is decently
efficient up to 512 bit primes, but it slows significantly
beyond that. The graphs of finite field size vs latency for the
client and verifiers can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 respectively.
The Square and Product algorithms for verification have
similar latencies for small finite field sizes, but Product is
significantly faster than Square for large finite field sizes
(over 1024 bits). In addition, Inverse is slower for the
client at all finite field sizes. This relationship can be seen
in Figures 2 and 4. A mojority of the client processing
time is spent blinding and transfering data over the newtork.
Because of this, we see large changes in performance due
to blinding algorithm choice. The Product algorithm is
Mode Client (ms) Server (ms)
Square 29.75.5 436.8968
Product 29.65 562.78
Inverse 45.24 473.94
Fig. 4. Algorithm vs Latency
The latency for client and server with different algorithms with a
finite field size of 256 bits, 3 parties, and input vectors 100 values
long. All algorithms are efficient at this size of finite field.
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Fig. 5. Number Queries vs Latency (Client)
Latency observed by client while sending many simultaneous queries
for verification.
much more efficient than the alternatives because it only
needs to execute (P − 1) multiplications per value to blind,
whereas Square performs (P − 1) exponentiation operations,
and Inverse performs (P − 1) multiplications and one
exponentiation. The majority of server time is not spent
doing the final verification step, so we do not see a change
in run-time for the servers when we change the algorithm used.
The number of simultaneous queries, unsurprisingly, affects
latency. This linear slowdown is observed by both clients
and verifiers. However, the slowdown has a gradual slope.
Increasing from 1 query to 100 simultaneous queries only
causes a slowdown of roughly 4 times. Figures 5 and 6 show
the relationship between the number of simultaneous queries
and latency for clients and verifiers respectively.
Our verification algorithm is highly parallelizable. Each
element in the original input vector can be handled separately,
and the only instance where threads must be joined is
on the final check performed in the validation step. This
leads to vector size not impacting latency for the clients
or verifiers. All differences in timings can be attributed
to external factors, such as random generation of larger
numbers or an increase in network load due to other users
on the network. The relationship between vector length and
latency for the client and verifiers is shown in Figures 7 and 8.
During our verification process, every verification
party communicates with all other servers, meaning our
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Fig. 6. Number Queries vs Latency (Server)
Server latency when processing multiple simultaneous verification
requests.
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Fig. 7. Vector Length vs Latency (Client)
The latency observed by clients for various sizes on input vector.
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Fig. 8. Vector Length vs Latency (Server)
Server latency for various input vector lengths.
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Fig. 9. Number of Parties vs Latency (Client)
Client latency vs number of parties used for verification.
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Fig. 10. Number of Parties vs Latency (Server)
Latency seen by servers for various number of parties used in
verification process.
communication complexity is O(P 2) where P is the number
of verification parties. This relationship is seen in our
experimental results for the verifiers. However, the client’s
dependency is linear in P because an increased number of
parties linearly relates to the number of blinded shares to
create. These relationships can be seen in Figures 9 and 10.
B. BGW Aggregation
BGW bit conversion is incredibly expensive. As shown
in [3], the BGW bit conversion protocol requires O(L logL)
BGW multiplications where L is the nubmer of bits we
wish to convert to. Each of these multiplications involves
every server sending and receiving data to and from every
other server, leading to large delays. Our findings mirrored
these results. Once parallelized, our consumer-level hardware
performed bit conversion in the following times:
L (bits) Server (s)
8 49.4
32 508
64 1,850
This is incredibly inefficient, even though the algorithms are
run in parallel. These times will improve with enterprise-level
hardware, however they will still be quite slow. Alternative
techniques (such as GMW circuits) are recommended.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has described an implementation for the valida-
tion and aggregation of secret unit vector inputs in an MPC
system. It has provided a fast, scalable system for validation
with minimal overhead and computation requirements while
retaining privacy as long as one honest server exists. It also
provided a (slow) scheme for aggregation on secret inputs
which only releases the sum if above a publicly known
threshold.
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